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ABSTRACT 
 
Congress reacted quickly to the accounting profession’s involvement in the Enron/Tyco 
International financial collapses in 2001. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated new reporting regulations aimed at preventing 
such losses in the future. A more remote effect occurred a year later in 2003 when Congress 
enacted sweeping reforms affecting the tax shelter industry. Congress targeted accounting firms 
and related professionals who created, marketed and sold abusive tax shelters. While the 
culpability of these professionals was clear the resulting criminal prosecutions against some of the 
accounting professionals were tainted by an overzealous prosecution which relied on 
unconstitutional tactics to obtain convictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he ethical standards of the legal and accounting profession have been pushed, prodded, bent, and in 
some cases broken for enormous monetary gain.
1
 
 
 
 And so began the 2003 U.S. Senate hearings investigating the roles of accountants, attorneys, and other 
financial professionals in abusive tax shelters.  The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations had uncovered how 
those shelters worked; how they were first structured to avoid scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service and then 
marketed to potential investors.  The emphasis of the committee’s report was unique in that most of the tax shelter 
products which were investigated were not technically illegal, yet they were found to be ethically questionable in 
that they demonstrated a deliberate effort on the part of the participants to avoid detection and scrutiny by the 
Internal Revenue Service.  Countless Americans, “average working families would bear the brunt of lost (tax) 
revenues so that a handful of rich lawyers, accountants, and their clients could manipulate legitimate business 
practices to make a profit.”2 
 
 In this article we review the government case against KPMG and some of its partners and managers who 
were accused of developing and promoting tax shelters, which deprive the government of tax revenues.  The 
indictment focused on KPMG’s strategies in intentionally designing these tax shelters to avoid detection by the IRS.  
Tax shelters are generally tax-savings devices but can range from tax planning that is allowable and even 
encouraged, such as retirement plans like 401(K) and IRA accounts, to abusive tax shelters such as business 
arrangements which take advantage of ambiguities or inconsistencies in the tax code and the establishment and use 
of off-shore companies to avoid or evade taxes.   
 
                                                 
1 Opening remarks, U.S. Senator Norm Coleman, MN; U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role Of Accountants, Lawyers, And 
Financial Professionals; Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations of the Committee On Governmental 
Affairs United States Senate; 108th Congr. 2 (2003) 
2 Id, at 4 
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 Section I discusses the hearings by The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs which investigated and 
uncovered these KPMG strategies, while Section II examines the improper, aggressive and ultimately self-defeating 
tactics employed by the government in the criminal prosecution of a tax case against certain KPMG associates 
which ultimately caused the case to be dismissed in substantial part.  Section III discusses the outcome of the case 
and the continuing Congressional scrutiny into these abusive strategies. 
 
THE SENATE HEARINGS 
 
 In 2001 the accounting profession drew much attention because of the well known, dishonest and 
fraudulent business practices conducted by Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco International and other companies.  
Financial failures, bankruptcies and criminal prosecutions followed, including the indictment of Enron’s auditors, 
Arthur Andersen LLP, which resulted in the dissolution of the firm.  Not long after, the President established a 
corporate fraud task force under the auspices of the Office of the United States Attorney General.  At the same time 
the Internal Revenue Service began investigating tax shelters and targeted the accounting firm of KPMG for its role 
in structuring and marketing certain abusive tax shelters.  The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs through 
its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations then began a similar investigation, and subpoenaed several KPMG 
partners and former partners to testify.  
 
 As indicated by Senator Coleman’s opening remarks the firm did not receive a warm welcome.  At one 
point during the proceedings, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan prompted a witness to “try an honest answer”3.  At 
this hearing, it was acknowledged that given the complexity of the tax law, the interpretation of the Internal Revenue 
Service is not legally binding. While it serves to memorialize the government’s interpretation of the Code, it is only 
an opinion and taxpayers have every right to disregard this interpretation provided they have a reasonable basis for 
doing so.  However, as the government’s enforcement agency, the Internal Revenue Service has the right to 
challenge any interpretation that it does not agree with.  Such challenges might ultimately result in a suit that would 
be settled by the interpretation of a court.  Before being able to challenge the interpretation of a taxpayer however, 
the IRS must first be aware of a taxpayer’s position.  The committee uncovered evidence that certain strategies 
employed by KPMG in its design of the subject tax shelters were intended to avoid detection by the IRS and further 
that the accounting firm had knowingly circumvented certain reporting and disclosure requirements which deprived 
the IRS of the opportunity to challenge them.  In addition, while lauding the accounting and legal professions for 
generally holding themselves up to high ethical standards, it was the clients of these professionals who would suffer 
by placing their trust and confidence in individuals who are not upholding these ethical standards. 
 
TAX SHELTERS 
 
 Tax shelters are generally strategies which permit taxpayers to shelter income from tax by taking advantage 
of allowable tax deductions or by having their income taxed at lower than ordinary tax rates. Although not generally 
referred to as such, Individual Retirement Plans (IRAs) and 401(K) accounts which enable individuals to invest pre-
tax earnings as part of their pension savings plans are types of tax shelters.  Home ownership can also be viewed as a 
type of tax shelter because of the allowable deductions for mortgage interest and real estate taxes as well as the tax 
credits available for certain types of home improvement expenditures such as those using solar energy. Congress 
encourages these types of activities by providing for the related tax benefits. However, tax savings resulting from 
innovative tax-planning strategies that wealthy individuals and companies use to take advantage of loopholes in the 
tax system run counter to Congressional intent.  
 
 In Internal Revenue Code Section 6662, a tax shelter is defined as a “partnership or other entity, an 
investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, 
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax”.  They include measures aimed at 
offsetting income from one source with losses from another source, manipulating income (generally subject to tax 
rates as high as 35%) as capital gains (which are subject to the more favorable 15% rate), or transferring gains 
offshore in order to minimize taxes.  Accounting firms aggressively promoted these types of tax shelters, especially 
in the 1990s, because of the substantial fees that they generated. These were abusive tax shelters which did not 
                                                 
3 Id at 43 
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necessarily generate income; instead they were created and structured primarily to maximize the amount of income 
that could be deducted for tax purposes, and they cost the government billions of dollars of lost revenues each year.  
Examples are the BLIPS (Bond-Linked Issue Premium Structure), FLIPS (Foreign Leveraged Investment 
Programs), and OPIS (Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy) shelters, which allow wealthy clients with vast 
capital gains to generate substantial capital and ordinary losses instead, in order to eliminate or drastically reduce 
taxable income.  For instance, a taxpayer with a BLIP, would borrow money from an offshore bank to invest in 
foreign currency sold by the same bank.  When the value of the currency declines, the taxpayer could then sell the 
currency back to the bank and claim a tax loss on the transactions. 
 
 The nature of the tax shelter industry had changed significantly over the recent past. Legal and accounting 
professionals had formerly been sought for tax planning advice but it seemed that certain professionals were now 
developing complex schemes and were marketing these schemes not only to their clients, but also to the general 
public in mass marketing efforts.  These included a massive telemarketing center maintained by KPMG staff with 
individuals trained to make cold calls to find buyers for specific tax products. 
 
 Evidence at the hearings also disclosed that KPMG refused to follow the advice of some of its own 
professionals within the firm to register certain of its tax products as tax shelters as required by the Internal Revenue 
Service.  Finally, the hearings uncovered the willingness of many other professionals and institutions such as banks, 
investment advisory firms and law firms to join in the structuring of these complex financial instruments and tax 
shelters which added to the illusion of economic substance and added an appearance of legitimacy. 
 
 As a result of these hearings, several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were enacted in an attempt to 
curtail the attempts at abuse by these tax professionals. Some of these newly enacted provisions are as follows: 
 
 IRC Section 6707A imposes penalties of up to $200,000 for failure to disclose certain elements of tax 
shelter activity on related tax returns; this penalty would be subject to administrative review but not judicial 
review. In addition, if the penalty is imposed on an entity which is required to file reports with the SEC, the 
fact that a penalty was imposed would have to be reported to that agency; 
 IRC 6662A imposes accuracy-related penalties of up to 30% of the understatement of tax relating to a tax 
shelter investment; 
 IRC 7525 eliminates the common law protection of confidentiality privileges for any communications 
relating to the promotion of participation in tax shelters; 
 IRC 6111, as amended, creates a new designation, referred to as a “material advisor”, for those who 
provide assistance or advice in organizing, promoting, selling or carrying out any reportable tax shelter 
transaction and imposes disclosure requirements regarding these transactions; and 
 IRC 6112, as amended, requires material advisors to maintain advisee/client lists available for inspection 
by the government.  
 
GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT IN THE KPMG CASE 
 
 Shortly after the spate of financial reporting deficiencies which contributed to the collapse of Enron and 
other public corporations in 2001 and the congressional hearings which followed, KPMG was involved in a related 
suit in which several of its partners and former partners were indicted for alleged violations of Internal Revenue 
Service regulations regarding tax shelters
4
.  The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that 
both their 5
th
 amendment constitutional right to a fair trial and their 6
th
 amendment constitutional right to counsel 
were violated.  The central theme of these alleged constitutional violations was the misconduct of the government in 
exerting influence over the KPMG firm to cut off funds it would have made available to these defendants to pay for 
their legal defense of this action.  The government’s position was that in certain cases the payment of legal fees by a 
company whose employees were charged with a crime would be indicative of an obstruction scheme, and would 
prevent these firms from cooperating with the government.  It was alleged by these defendants that the government’s 
action effectively cut off their right to the counsel of their choosing and thus would prevent them from receiving a 
fair trial.   
                                                 
4 US v Jeffrey Stein et al, 435 F supp. 2d 330, US District Court for the Southern District of New York 
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 Several of the defendants in this action had previously testified before the Senate hearings and the IRS 
proceedings concerning tax shelters.  The defendants who were still active partners at KPMG were asked to leave 
the firm and were granted very generous severance packages, including being promised indemnification against any 
legal costs incurred by reason of this pending action.  This had been a longstanding practice of KPMG and in fact, 
many companies followed this policy of reimbursing an employee for legal expenses incurred in connection with 
their employment.  
 
 In pre-trial discussions, the government negotiated with counsel for KPMG. The firm, although not a 
defendant, retained counsel in an attempt to negotiate a favorable settlement of the entire matter and avoid being 
indicted itself.  During these negotiations the prosecution indicated that the government might view the payment by 
KPMG of employee legal fees as rewarding misconduct
5
.  The message delivered, and clearly understood by 
KPMG, was that its adherence to its longstanding practice of paying employee legal fees might hurt it in its position 
regarding the government’s decision to possibly indict the firm.  The court’s view of this not so subliminal message 
was that although government representatives “did not say in so many words that it did not want KPMG to pay legal 
fees, no one at the meeting could have failed to draw that conclusion”6.   
 
 Further along in these discussions, KPMG relented to this government pressure and made the decision to 
abandon its longstanding practice of reimbursing employees legal fees. Its newly adopted position was that it did not 
see that it had any binding legal obligation to pay these fees.  The ultimate agreement that was reached between 
KPMG and the government was that it would put a limit on legal fees and would condition the payment for any 
given employee on that employee cooperating fully with the government in its investigation.  One indication of the 
effect of the government’s influence on KPMG and, indirectly, on the defendants’ ability to mount a defense, was a 
statement by counsel for KPMG to the attorney for one of the employee-defendants.  KPMG would pay the 
defendant’s legal fees so long as the defendant cooperated with the government and did not, for example, invoke her 
privilege against self-incrimination under the 5
th
 amendment by refusing to testify
7.  The government’s influence on 
the defendants’ ability to retain counsel was thus very clear and the court did not like it. 
 
 The agreement between KPMG and its employees who were subject to investigation was that unless the 
employees cooperated with the government in a prompt and truthful manner, legal fees would cease immediately, as 
they would if an indictment were in fact issued against an individual.  The government took full advantage of its 
controlling position and repeatedly notified KPMG counsel when any of its personnel failed to comply with 
government demands.  This notification resulted in counsel for KPMG reminding the attorney for the non-compliant 
employee that payment of legal fees would be terminated unless the employee cooperated with the government in its 
investigation.  KPMG did not make any effort to hide its motivation in cooperating with, and in fact being controlled 
by, the government; its only real concern was avoiding an indictment against the firm even at the cost of pressuring 
its employees to cooperate, sometimes against their own personal interests
8
.   
 
 Ultimately KPMG benefited from assisting and cooperating with the government.  In August 2005, KPMG 
and the government entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement under which it agreed to admit wrongdoing, 
would pay a substantial fine, and accept an indictment on one charge, which it was agreed, would later be dismissed.  
KMPG thus avoided criminal conviction. 
 
 In making its determination in dismissing these indictments, the court thoroughly reviewed many of the 
notes of meetings and discussions among the government, KPMG counsel, and counsel for various defendants.  Its 
conclusions were easy to reach.  Threats were inherent in the government’s relationship with all parties concerned.  
It wielded significant power in its ability to indict KPMG and used this power to affect the legal representation 
which was available to KPMG’s employees and former employees.  In other words, it stacked the deck against these 
defendants. The government’s actions subverted the defendants’ right to be represented by an attorney of their own 
choosing free of any government regulation or threats, and unfettered by any restrictions imposed by its adversary.  
                                                 
5 Id at 29 
6 Id at 32 
7 Id at 33 
8 Id at 44 
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“In short, fairness in a criminal proceeding requires that the defendant be firmly in the driver’s seat, and that the 
prosecution not be a backseat driver”9.  The government’s action here deprived the defendants of due process in 
denying them their fundamental right to protection of liberty and justice.  
 
 The court further found that there was more than a mere procedural error in this case, which might or might 
not affect the proceeding.  The acts committed by the government were so pervasive that they were considered 
structural defects in that the defendants were constructively denied counsel for the entire proceeding.  The court thus 
found that the entire proceedings were contaminated by the government’s conduct and that there was no need to 
show specific prejudice.  The government’s interference in these defendants’ ability to mount a defense created the 
appearance of impropriety, which diminished the faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general
10
.   
 
 The court agreed with the defendants’ claim that they were denied their rights to choose their own counsel 
and receive a fair trial, and granted their motion to dismiss the indictment on these grounds.  The defendants’ motion 
for monetary sanctions against the government was however denied.    
 
 On appeal the appellate court found of the prosecution’s conduct that “Their deliberate interference with 
the defendants' rights was outrageous and shocking in the constitutional sense because it was fundamentally at odds 
with two of our most basic constitutional values -- the right to counsel and the right to fair criminal proceedings.”11 
In affirming the dismissal of the charges, the court stated that it “ has reached this conclusion only after pursuing 
every alternative short of dismissal  and only with the greatest reluctance. This indictment charges serious crimes. 
They should have been decided on the merits as to every defendant…. But there are limits on the permissible actions 
of even the best prosecutors.”12 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
 The inquiry into the roles of professionals in the tax shelter industry did not end with the 108
th
 
Congressional session. The Senate Committee Report of the 109
th
 session of Congress stated in its introduction: 
 
The abusive tax shelters investigated by the Subcommittee were complex transactions used by corporations or 
individuals to obtain substantial tax benefits in a manner never intended by the Federal tax code. While some of 
these transactions may have complied with the literal language of specific tax provisions, they produced results that 
were unwarranted, unintended, or inconsistent with the overall structure or underlying policy of the Internal 
Revenue Code. These transactions had no economic substance or business purpose other than to reduce taxes. 
Abusive tax shelters can be custom-designed for a single user or prepared as a generic tax product sold to multiple 
clients. The Subcommittee investigation focused on generic abusive tax shelters sold to multiple clients as opposed 
to a custom-tailored tax strategy sold to a single client.
13
 
 
 The committee also reported in its Findings and Recommendations that “…numerous respected members 
of the American business community were heavily involved in the development, marketing, and implementation of 
generic tax products whose principal objective was to reduce or eliminate a client's U.S. tax liability. These tax 
shelters required close collaboration between accounting firms, law firms, investment advisory firms, and banks.”14  
The result of this session of Congress was to amend certain of the reporting and penalty provisions enacted by the 
previous Congressional session. 
 
                                                 
9 Id at 71 
10 Id at 118 
11 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, at 414 
12 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, at 427 
13 The Role Of Professional Firms In The U.S. Tax Shelter Industry;  
R E P O R T prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations 
Of The Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs 
United States Senate; 109th Congr. 2 (2005) 
14 Id 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December 2012   Volume 10, Number 12 
670 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ © 2012 The Clute Institute 
 The focus of this study expanded beyond the government’s involvement in the tax shelter industry as 
investigators and legislators. Its subsequent involvement in this same industry was that of prosecutors. Here we 
found improper measures taken by federal prosecutors in their attempts to procure a conviction. These improprieties 
were so pervasive that their ultimate effect was to deny the defendants due process and they suffered the severest of 
sanctions, dismissal of the charges.   
 
 Several issues are raised in this study. The first issue is raised in relation to agency theory, with the public 
as the principal and the government as the agent.  The actions of the agent, in this case, the federal prosecutors, were 
not aimed at benefiting the principal.  They had their own agenda; to win the case at any cost.  However, the 
curtailment of the defendants’ constitutional rights was the antithesis of promoting the objectives of the principal.   
 
 The second issue relates to the legal rights of the individual, which have both Utilitarian and Kantian 
foundations.  From a Utilitarian context, the actions of the government prosecutors were indicative of an abuse of 
power and a violation of the trust and credibility that should be an essential element of the judicial system. Their role 
should be to promote the public interest and their activities should be geared towards upholding the public good.  As 
public officials, they should have been aware of the lines that should not be crossed.  Instead, they were over-
zealous in their actions against the defendants; they disregarded their duty in the quest for a guilty verdict; and 
thereby, wrought harm to the defendants.  This should be evaluated in relation to the benefits that could have 
resulted from a guilty verdict, which includes future potentially higher tax revenues for the government, while at the 
same time, serving as a deterrent to future accountants, financial professionals, and attorneys from attempting to take 
advantage of the tax loopholes that spawned the tax shelters in the first place. 
 
 From a Kantian/Deontological perspective, the actions of the prosecutors resulted in a violation of the 
rights of the defendants, when they were denied access to counsel and a fair trial.  A commentary in the Wall Street 
Journal in July 2007 noted the duty of the government to respect the rights of citizens involved in criminal activities.  
Whenever it fails in its duty, it surrenders its legitimacy that gives it the power to try people for crimes that they 
commit. 
 
 The third issue of note is the philosophical contradictions that arise in the case against KPMG.  It was clear 
from the outcome that the actions of the prosecutors were harmful to the defendants.  However, individuals 
sometimes are faced with the conflict of doing what society deems to be the right thing (Kantian Deontology), while 
at the same time winning by any means (Machiavellianism).  The prosecutors were faced with the task of acting on 
principle for the public good while at the same time serving the interest of the public (Bailey, 1965).  They had to 
get a conviction, even if it meant harming others in the process.  These issues lend themselves to the dilemma faced 
by public officials as they try to balance the elements of responsibility, efficiency, accountability, and morality. 
 
 Finally, the case highlights the need for punishment and/or sanctions against public officials who abuse the 
power with which they are entrusted.  The partners and employees who were denied ‘due process’ should be able to 
claim monetary damages or some other kind of retribution from the individuals who violated their constitutional 
rights.  In addition, if the media focus on incidences of government misconduct was as relentless as their focus on 
the actions of celebrities, the public would become more informed about the individuals in government employment, 
and the public scrutiny would serve as a deterrent to bad behavior by government officials.   
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
William A. Bottiglieri, MBA, CPA, JD, is a Professor in Accounting at Iona College, New Rochelle, New York 
and is in private practice as an attorney and tax accountant. E-mail:  wbottiglieri@iona.edu  (Corresponding author) 
 
Huldah Ryan, Ph.D., is a Professor in Accounting at Iona College, New Rochelle, New York. 
 
Andrew S. Griffith, Ph.D., DBA, EA, CIA, CFE, is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Iona College. 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December 2012   Volume 10, Number 12 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ 671 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Bailey, S. K., 1965. The Relation Between Ethics and Public Service, in R. C. Martin  (Ed.), Public 
Administration and Democracy: Essays in honor of Paul Appleby  Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, pp. 282-298. 
2. Brady, F. and D. Hart, 2006.  An Aesthetic Theory of Conflict in Administrative Ethics, Administration & 
Society, March, Vol. 38: 1, pp. 113-134. 
3. Curry, P., Hill, C., and F. Parisi, 2007. Creating Failures in the Market for Tax Planning, Virginia Tax 
Review, Spring 26: (4), pp. 943-969.  
4. Hardin, R. 2004. Trust and Trustworthiness. Russel Sage Paperback ed. 
5. Hickman, K. 2007. Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, Virginia Tax Review, Spring 26: (4), pp. 905-937. 
6. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360. 
7. Kahn, W. A., 1990. Toward an Agenda for Business Ethics Research, Academy of Management Review 15, 
(2): 311–328. 
8. Warren, M. 1999. Democracy Theory and Trust, in Mark E. Warren ed., Democracy and Trust, pp. 310-
345. 
9. Weisbach, D. A. 2002.  An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, American Law and 
Economics Review, Vol. 4, 1, pp. 88- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December 2012   Volume 10, Number 12 
672 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ © 2012 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
